Experimental analysis of Bayesian voting mechanisms, procedural choices and the acceptance of transfers
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|Duration:||01.01.2018 - 31.12.2021|
Decisions about political reforms are governed by many different rules. This project intends (i) to experimentally evaluate the performance of various decision-making rules and (ii) to experimentally study the selection of rules. Specifically, the purpose of the project is to analyze the political behavior of individuals who have private information about how they expect policies to affect their well-being. For this purpose, the project experimentally investigates individual choices in complex Bayesian games in which players hold private information and know only about the distribution of other players’ information. Our focus is on institutional innovations that potentially increase the efficiency of the resulting social choice. These innovations include two-stage voting procedures, the bundling of decisions, the use of compensation payments, and hybrid decision procedures that use votes and transfers. So far, the major focus of the project has been on the choices of individuals when they decide on procedural rules in Bayesian games and on the elicitation of distributional preferences. During the third funding period, the project also experimentally investigated the possibility to buy welfare-enhancing reforms from two or more veto players. Further experimental research in these areas shall complement our theoretical insights about possible improvements of existing decision-making rules that help to facilitate implementing efficiency-enhancing reforms.