Legislative reforms and party competition
| Associates: ||Shaun Bevan, Ph.D. / Prof. Sven-Oliver-Proksch, Ph.D. |
|Duration:||01.01.2010 - 31.12.2017|
Project C1 investigates the (in)ability of governments to initiate and adopt policy reforms in parliamentary systems. The primary research goal of the first phase was to study how party competition and coalition policy-making affect the initiation of reforms from a comparative perspective. In parliamentary systems, ministers are responsible for coalition governance by drafting (coalition) reform initiatives, which can be scrutinized, amended and rejected in cabinet and parliament. To understand the reform process in coalition governments, we developed a formal model of coalition governance with two coalition partners that explains when ministers initiate proposals, when coalition partners challenge ministerial drafts, and when coalition governments as a whole fail to propose reforms. We tested the empirical implications of our model regarding legislative initiation using a comparative legislation dataset. To analyse the pre-legislative agenda stage, we generated novel data on the exogenous reform demand in Germany and Austria for a twenty-year period.