Experimental analysis of Bayesian voting mechanisms, procedural choices and the acceptance of transfers
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|Duration:||01.01.2014 - 31.12.2017|
This research project experimentally studies the behaviour of voters in political decisions when individuals are privately informed about their preferences regarding specific policy reforms. The project is intended to evaluate the performance of, and the support for, various decision-making procedures. For this purpose, the project investigates, using laboratory experiments, individual choices in Bayesian games, which are games where players hold private information and only know about the distribution of other players’ information. In particular, we study the choices of individuals when they decide on procedural rules in such games. Moreover, the project experimentally investigates the possibilities for buying welfare-enhancing reforms from those voters who dislike them. In this context, the project also addresses more fundamental questions about the key behavioural attractors in (collective) decision-making.